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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their civil-rights suit 
against the City of New York (the “City”).  They claim to be 
targets of a wide-ranging surveillance program that the New 
York City Police Department (the “NYPD”) began in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (the 
“Program”).  Plaintiffs allege that the Program is based on the 
false and stigmatizing premise that Muslim religious identity 
“is a permissible proxy for criminality, and that Muslim 
individuals, businesses, and institutions can therefore be 
subject to pervasive surveillance not visited upon individuals, 
businesses, and institutions of any other religious faith or the 
public at large.”  First Am. Compl. ¶ 6 (the “Complaint” or 
“Compl.”).  They bring this lawsuit “to affirm the principle 
that individuals may not be singled out for intrusive 
investigation and pervasive surveillance that cause them 
continuing harm simply because they profess a certain 
faith.”  Id. ¶ 8. 
 In its narrowest form, this appeal raises two questions: 
Do Plaintiffs—themselves allegedly subject to a 
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discriminatory surveillance program—have standing to sue in 
federal court to vindicate their religious-liberty and equal-
protection rights?  If so, taking Plaintiffs’ non-conclusory 
allegations as true, have they stated valid claims under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to our Constitution?  Both 
of these questions, which we answer yes, seem 
straightforward enough.  Lurking beneath the surface, 
however, are questions about equality, religious liberty, the 
role of courts in safeguarding our Constitution, and the 
protection of our civil liberties and rights equally during 
wartime and in peace.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations 
Lead Plaintiff Syed Faraj Hassan and others of or 
associated with the Islamic faith (collectively “Plaintiffs”) 
assert that, since January 2002, the City has through the 
NYPD conducted the Program in secret “to monitor the lives 
of Muslims, their businesses, houses of worship, 
organizations, and schools in New York City and surrounding 
states, particularly New Jersey.”  See Pls.’ Br. 2 (citing 
Compl. ¶¶ 36, 38).  As this case comes before us on the City’s 
Motion to Dismiss, we must take all facts alleged in 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences that arise therefrom in their favor.  See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6). 
1. The Program  
 Plaintiffs contend that the NYPD launched the 
Program following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
with the goal of “infiltra[ting] and monitor[ing] Muslim life 
in and around New York City.”  Compl. ¶ 2.  They claim that 
it “target[s] Muslim entities and individuals in New Jersey for 
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investigation solely because they are Muslim or believed to 
be Muslim” rather than “based upon evidence of 
wrongdoing.”  Id. ¶¶ 7, 47.  Plaintiffs claim that the Program, 
going on its tenth year when the Complaint was filed, “has 
never generated a single lead.”  Id. ¶ 2.   
 Per the Complaint, the NYPD “uses a variety of 
methods to spy on Muslims.”  Id. ¶ 39.  Among the 
techniques that it employs are to “snap pictures, take video, 
and collect license plate numbers of [mosque] congregants” 
and to “mount surveillance cameras on light poles, aimed at 
mosques,” which “[o]fficers can [then] control 
[remotely] . . . with their computers” and which generate 
footage used “to help identify worshippers.”  Id. ¶ 46.  
Plaintiffs also allege the NYPD sends “undercover 
officers”—some of which are called “mosque crawlers” and 
“rakers”—into mosques, student organizations, businesses, 
and neighborhoods that “it believes to be heavily Muslim.”  
Id. ¶¶ 47, 49–50.  By “monitor[ing] sermons and 
conversations in mosques” and “surveil[ling] locations such 
as bookstores, bars, cafes, and nightclubs,” officers 
“document[] . . . American Muslim life” in “painstaking 
detail[]” and “report back to the NYPD.”  Id. ¶ 47. 
 While Plaintiffs believe that some of this surveillance 
activity is passive (such as “tak[ing] video and photographs at 
mosques, Muslim-owned businesses, and schools,” id. ¶ 39, 
and recording “the subject of conversations overheard at 
mosques,” id. ¶ 47), in other cases NYPD officers more 
actively engage with the persons monitored.  One alleged 
spying method of the latter type is to “sen[d] undercover 
officers to [Muslim-affiliated] locations to engage in 
pretextual conversations to elicit information from proprietors 
and patrons.”  Id. ¶ 39.  Officers also “sometimes pose” as 
members of certain groups and organizations under 
investigation.  Id. ¶ 50.  The Complaint illustrates one such 
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example where an NYPD “officer . . . went on a rafting trip 
with a[] [Muslim Students Association (MSA)] and 
monitored and recorded how often the student participants on 
the trip prayed” and their “discuss[ion of] religious 
topics.”  Id. 
 Not only does the alleged Program “utilize[] numerous 
forms of surveillance,” id. ¶ 45, but that surveillance is also 
widespread.  Plaintiffs claim, for instance, that the NYPD 
“has strived to have an informant inside every mosque within 
a 250-mile radius of New York City” and has “place[d] 
informants or undercover officers in all or virtually all 
MSAs” at “colleges and universities in New York, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania . . . without any 
indication whatsoever of criminal activity or any connection 
whatsoever to wrongdoing.”  Id. ¶¶ 47, 49.  In all, the NYPD 
has allegedly “surveill[ed] . . . at least twenty mosques, 
fourteen restaurants, eleven retail stores, two grade schools 
and two [MSAs], in addition to an untold number of 
individuals who own, operate, and visit those 
establishments.”  Id. ¶ 3. 
 Plaintiffs claim that, in addition to singling out 
organizations and businesses for surveillance that in some 
way are visibly or openly affiliated with Islam (such as 
mosques or businesses with prayer mats or other Islamic 
identifications), “the Program also intentionally targets 
Muslims by using ethnicity as a proxy for faith.”  Id. ¶ 40.  
Plaintiffs aver, for instance, that the NYPD “has designated 
twenty-eight countries . . . constitut[ing] about 80% of the 
world’s Muslim population” and “American Black Muslim” 
as “ancestries of interest.”  Id. ¶ 41.  But the Program is still 
decidedly focused on religion.  Thus, rather than “surveil all 
people and establishments with ‘ancestries of interest,’” the 
NYPD “expressly chooses to exclude people and 
establishments with such ‘ancestries’ if they are not Muslim.”  
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Id. ¶ 42.  This includes “Egyptians if they are Coptic 
Christians, Syrians if they are Jewish, or Albanians if they are 
Catholic or Orthodox Christian.”  Id.  Conversely, Plaintiffs 
claim that the NYPD has examined other immigrant 
communities in Newark, New Jersey “for the presence of 
Muslims,” such as the “Portuguese and Brazilian immigrant 
communities” notwithstanding that “Portugal and Brazil 
[are] . . . not found on [the NYPD’s] list of twenty-eight 
‘ancestries.’”  Id. ¶ 44. 
2. Reports and Informational Databases 
 Plaintiffs allege that the Program has resulted in “a 
series of reports documenting in detail the information 
obtained from [the NYPD’s] surveillance of New Jersey 
Muslim communities.”  Id. ¶ 5.  These “includ[e] a report 
focusing on the Muslim community in Newark” (the “Newark 
report”), id.; “more than twenty precinct-level maps of the 
City of Newark, noting the location of mosques and Muslim 
businesses and the ethnic composition of the Muslim 
community,” id. ¶ 3; “analytical report[s] on every mosque 
within 100 miles” of New York City, id. ¶ 47; and a weekly 
“MSA Report on schools, including reports on Rutgers New 
Brunswick and Rutgers Newark,” id. ¶ 51.    
 The information and records collected and compiled 
are extensive and varied.  Among these are 
“pictures, . . . video, . . . and license plate numbers of 
[mosque] congregants,” id. ¶ 46; intelligence about “where 
religious schools are located,” id. ¶ 47; indications of 
religious affiliation and Muslim patronage of shops, 
restaurants, and grocery stores, id.; lists of “businesses owned 
or frequented by Muslims,” id.; and “names of professors, 
scholars, and students” affiliated with MSAs, id. ¶ 51.  The 
City also allegedly “compiles databases of new Muslim 
converts who take Arabic names, as well as Muslims who 
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take names that are perceived to be ‘Western.’”  Id. ¶ 55.  
 Besides names and other identifying information of 
individuals, businesses, and organizations, the NYPD reports 
include seemingly mundane and innocuous details about 
Muslim community life in New Jersey, such as: (1) “flyers 
are posted in shops advertising for Quran tutoring;” (2) “a 
picture of a mosque hangs in a grocery store;” (3) “a 
restaurant serves ‘religious Muslims;’” (4) “customers visit a 
Dunkin’ Donuts after Friday prayer;” (5) “a restaurant is 
located near a particular mosque;” (6) “employees or 
customers of establishments are observed wearing ‘traditional 
clothing;’” (7) “Muslim prayer mats are hanging on the wall 
at an Indian restaurant;” and (8) “a store posts a sign that it 
will be closed on Friday in observance of Friday prayer.”  Id. 
¶ 47.  Finally, NYPD officers have compiled “the subject[s 
and details] of conversations overheard at mosques.”  Id.  In 
one 2006 report, for instance, they “document[ed] twenty-
three conversations at twenty mosques,” though “[n]one of 
the information collected showed any indication of criminal 
activity.”  Id. 
3. Fall-Out from the Program’s Disclosure 
to the Public 
 Plaintiffs claim that, despite “initial secrecy,” public 
knowledge of the alleged Program’s existence “has become 
widespread in New Jersey and elsewhere.”  Id. ¶ 45.  They 
also contend that a number of the allegedly generated reports 
“ha[ve] been widely publicized,” id. ¶ 20, and that each 
Plaintiff has been “either specifically named in an NYPD 
spying report or is a member of at least one mosque or other 
association named in such a report,” Pls.’ Br. 21 (citing 
Compl. ¶¶ 12–15, 17–26, 28–29, 31–32, 34).   
 Plaintiffs have learned since the news broke, for 
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instance, that the NYPD’s so-called “Newark report” 
designates several of them as a “Location of Concern,” 
defined “as, among other things, a ‘location that individuals 
may find co-conspirators for illegal actions,’ and a ‘location 
that has demonstrated a significant pattern of illegal 
activities.’”  Compl. ¶ 58.  Similarly, the NYPD’s “U.S.–Iran 
report” describes organizations believed to pose serious 
threats to New York City, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, 
along with a list of “Other Shi’a Locations in the vicinity of 
NYC,” which include Plaintiff Muslim Foundation Inc. 
(“MFI”) and Masjid-e-Ali mosque (owned and operated by 
MFI), “as well as three additional mosques attended by 
Plaintiff Hassan.”  Id. ¶ 60. 
 While Plaintiffs allege that the Program is stigmatizing 
by itself, they also claim these specific defamatory statements 
targeting them in particular have intensified their harms and 
that “New York City officials” have exacerbated these 
injuries by publicly “acknowledg[ing] the [Program’s] 
existence” and “describing it as focused on ‘threats’ and as an 
attempt to document the ‘likely whereabouts of terrorists.’”  
Id. ¶ 61.  “Discussing the surveillance, [former] Mayor 
Bloomberg has stated publicly” that “[w]e’re doing the right 
thing.  We will continue to do the right thing.”  Id. ¶ 64.  And 
“[former Police] Commissioner Kelly has said” that “[w]e’re 
going to continue to do what we have to do to protect the 
[C]ity.”  Id.  Plaintiffs state that these and other “official 
proclamations,” which “falsely suggest that Muslims alone 
present a unique law enforcement threat,” indicate “that [City 
officials] believe the NYPD’s targeting of Muslims for 
surveillance on the basis of their religion is appropriate and 
will continue.”  Id. ¶¶ 64–65. 
 Plaintiffs also contend that, in large part because of the 
Program’s alleged stigmatizing and reputational 
consequences, the surveillance has affected their worship and 
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religious activities.  For example, Plaintiff Hassan, a soldier 
in the U.S. Army who has worked in military intelligence, 
asserts that “[h]e has decreased his mosque attendance 
significantly” because of his belief that “being closely 
affiliated with mosques under surveillance by law 
enforcement” will jeopardize his ability to hold a security 
clearance and will tarnish his reputation among his fellow 
soldiers and diminish their trust in him.  Id. ¶¶ 11–13.  
Likewise, Plaintiffs Moiz Mohammed, Jane Doe, and Soofia 
Tahir state that they now avoid (or have avoided) discussing 
their faith openly or at MSA meetings for fear of being 
watched and documented, id. ¶¶ 24–30, and Plaintiff 
Mohammad alleges that “[t]he stigma now attached to being a 
Muslim member of the MSA has caused [him] to avoid 
discussing his faith or his MSA participation in public and to 
avoid praying in places where non-Muslims might see him 
doing so,” id. ¶ 25.   
 The individual Plaintiffs are not the only ones affected.  
The organizational Plaintiffs allege that the Program “has 
undermined their ability to fulfill their mission[s by] deterring 
potential members from joining and casting doubt on [their] 
ability to maintain the confidentiality of their membership.”  
Pls.’ Br. 6 (citing Compl. ¶ 17).  According to the Complaint, 
two mosques that are members of Plaintiff Council of Imams 
in New Jersey, and that are named in the NYPD’s Newark 
report, “have . . . seen a decline in attendance . . . as a result 
of the [NYPD’s] surveillance” because their congregants can 
no longer worship freely knowing that law-enforcement 
agents or informants are likely in their midst.  Compl. ¶ 15.  
Similarly, “[a]s affinity student groups, MSAs subject to 
surveillance . . . are diminished in their ability to establish 
viable student organizations that students will feel secure 
joining and participating in” and are less able “to embark 
upon integral partnerships with campus administrators and 
other organizations and [to] fulfill the spiritual needs of their 
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members in a confidential manner.”  Id. ¶ 17.  And Plaintiff 
MFI has changed its religious and educational programming 
to avoid controversial topics likely to stigmatize its 
membership further and to attract additional NYPD attention.  
Id. ¶ 23. 
 Finally, several Plaintiffs also contend that financial 
harm has accompanied their alleged religious, reputational, 
and stigmatizing injuries.  For example, Plaintiffs All Shop 
Body Inside & Outside and Unity Beef Sausage Company 
claim that the surveillance has damaged their “business[es] by 
scaring away customers,” id. ¶¶ 19, 21, and Plaintiffs Zaimah 
Abdur-Rahim and Abdul-Hakim Abdullah allege that the 
publication of the address and a photograph on the Internet of 
their home “in connection with the NYPD’s 
surveillance . . . has decreased [its] value . . . and diminished 
[its] prospects for sale,” id. ¶¶ 31–32, 34.  Also, two of 
Plaintiff Council of Imams in New Jersey’s member mosques 
have witnessed “[l]osses in . . . financial support,” which 
further “harm[s] both mosques’ ability to fulfill their religious 
missions.”  Id. ¶ 15.  
B. District Court 
 In June 2012, Plaintiffs sued the City pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of 
the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for discriminating 
against them as Muslims in violation of the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  They seek 
expungement of any unlawfully obtained records pertaining 
to them, a judgment declaring that the City has violated their 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, an order enjoining 
their future discriminatory surveillance, and damages. 
 The District Court granted the City’s Motion to 
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Dismiss the Complaint in February 2014 pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim.  First, the Court held that Plaintiffs failed to identify 
any cognizable “injury-in-fact” (let alone one “fairly 
traceable” to the City’s surveillance).  Second, it concluded 
that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim because “[t]he more 
likely explanation for the surveillance was a desire to locate 
budding terrorist conspiracies” than a desire to discriminate.  
Hassan v. City of New York, No. 12-cv-3401, 2014 WL 
654604, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014).  It therefore entered 
judgment in the City’s favor.  Plaintiffs now appeal these 
rulings.  
III. STANDING 
As did the District Court, we begin with Plaintiffs’ 
standing to have a federal court decide their claims.  Standing 
to sue is required for jurisdiction in a federal forum.  Derived 
from Article III of our Constitution, it is the threshold inquiry 
in every case, one for which “[t]he party invoking federal 
jurisdiction bears the burden of [proof].”  Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  Analyzing this 
requirement entails a three-part inquiry.  Has at least one 
plaintiff suffered an “injury in fact”?  Id.  If so, is that injury 
“fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant”?  Id. at 560 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 
(1976)).  And if the answer to both is yes, will that injury be 
“likely . . . redressed by a favorable decision”?  Id. at 561 
(quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).   
 When answering these questions, “we must assume 
that the party asserting federal jurisdiction is correct on the 
legal merits of his claim, that a decision on the merits would 
be favorable[,] and that the requested relief would be 
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granted.”  Cutler v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
797 F.3d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In other words, to withstand a “facial attack” 
at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff need only plausibly 
allege facts establishing each constitutional requirement.  
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996).  
A. Injury-in-Fact  
 A plaintiff alleges injury-in-fact when it claims that it 
has, or is in imminent danger of having, suffered “an invasion 
of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and 
particularized” and “‘actual or imminent, not conjectural and 
hypothetical.’”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The burden is low, requiring nothing more 
than “‘an identifiable trifle’ of harm.”  Joint Stock Soc’y v. 
UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 177 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, 
J.) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973)).   
 While Plaintiffs point to at least four other injuries 
they contend also meet this requirement, “[t]he indignity of 
being singled out [by a government] for special burdens on 
the basis of one’s religious calling,” Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 
712, 731 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), is enough to get in the 
courthouse door.  Unequal treatment is “a type of personal 
injury [that] ha[s] long [been] recognized as judicially 
cognizable,” Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738 (1984), 
and virtually every circuit court has reaffirmed1—as has the 
                                              
1 See, e.g., Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 
2015) (“[E]qual treatment under law is a judicially cognizable 
interest . . . even if it brings no tangible benefit to the party 
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Supreme Court—that a “discriminatory classification is itself 
a penalty,” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999), and thus 
qualifies as an actual injury for standing purposes, where a 
citizen’s right to equal treatment is at stake.  See also Ne. Fla. 
Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 657 (1993) (“The ‘injury in 
fact’ . . . is the denial of equal treatment . . . .”).2  
                                                                                                     
asserting it.”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. 
Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The 
injury in fact is the denial of equal treatment.”); Planned 
Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 790 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“Discriminatory treatment . . . qualif[ies] as an actual 
injury for standing purposes.”); Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod 
v. FCC, 154 F.3d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he claim 
that the litigant was denied equal treatment is sufficient to 
constitute Article III ‘injury in-fact.’”); Peyote Way Church of 
God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1991) (“[I]llegitimate unequal treatment is an injury unto 
itself . . . .”). 
 
2 Plaintiffs’ personal interest in religious equality falls 
squarely within the zone of those protected by the 
constitutional guarantees in question.  While their claims 
certainly strike at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment’s guarantee 
of freedom of religion includes freedom from religious 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of 
New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589, 597 (1845) (“Equality before the 
law is of the very essence of liberty, whether civil or 
religious.”); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 
1257 (10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.) (“From the beginning, 
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None of the City’s arguments to the contrary are 
persuasive.  First, its argument that unequal treatment is only 
injurious when it involves a tangible benefit like college 
admission or Social Security takes too cramped a view of 
Article III’s injury requirement.  As the Supreme Court has 
noted,   
discrimination itself, by perpetuating “archaic 
and stereotypic notions” or by stigmatizing 
members of the disfavored group as “innately 
inferior” and therefore as less worthy 
participants in the political community, can 
cause serious noneconomic injuries to those 
                                                                                                     
this nation’s conception of religious liberty included, at a 
minimum, the equal treatment of all religious faiths without 
discrimination or preference.”); cf. Karl Loewenstein, Some 
General Observations on the Proposed “International Bill of 
Rights” 17 (1942). 
“[T]he Religion Clauses . . . and the Equal Protection 
Clause as applied to religion . . . all speak with one voice on 
this point: Absent the most unusual circumstances, one’s 
religion ought not affect one’s legal rights or duties or 
benefits.”  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment in part); see also, e.g., 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 845 (1995); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–45 
(1982); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U.S. 756, 792–93 (1973); Gillette v. United States, 401 
U.S. 437, 449 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 
104 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 
1, 15 (1947). 
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persons who are personally denied equal 
treatment solely because of their membership in 
a disfavored group. 
Heckler, 465 U.S. at 739–40 (citation omitted) (quoting Miss. 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)); see 
also, e.g., Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 
1074 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“[A] victim of 
discrimination suffers a dehumanizing injury as real as, and 
often of far more severe and lasting harm than, a blow to the 
jaw.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  After all, “[t]he 
fundamental concern of discrimination law is to redress the 
dignitary affront that decisions based on group characteristics 
represent, not to guarantee specific economic expectancies.”  
Sandberg v. KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 111 F.3d 331, 335 
(2d Cir. 1997). 
The City next argues that Plaintiffs have suffered no 
injury-in-fact because it has not overtly condemned the 
Muslim religion.  City Br. 35.  This argument does not stand 
the test of time.  Our Nation’s history teaches the 
uncomfortable lesson that those not on discrimination’s 
receiving end can all too easily gloss over the “badge of 
inferiority” inflicted by unequal treatment itself.  Closing our 
eyes to the real and ascertainable harms of discrimination 
inevitably leads to morning-after regret.  Compare Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“[If] enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a 
badge of inferiority . . . [,] it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses 
to put that construction upon it.”), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [children] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
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Moving on, we are similarly unpersuaded by the City’s 
alternative argument that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not 
“particularized.”  It is true that “only . . . a complainant [who] 
possesses something more than a general interest in the 
proper execution of the laws . . . is in a position to secure 
judicial intervention.”  Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 304 
(1944).  But where a plaintiff is “asserting [his or her] own 
[equality] right,” a claim of discrimination, even where it 
affects a broad class, “is not an abstract concern or 
‘generalized grievance.’”  Ad Hoc Comm. of Concerned 
Teachers v. Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 
25, 29 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
499 (1975)).  Because Plaintiffs in this case claim to be the 
very targets of the allegedly unconstitutional surveillance, 
they are unquestionably “affect[ed] . . . in a personal and 
individual way.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
Further, that hundreds or thousands (or even millions) 
of other persons may have suffered the same injury does not 
change the individualized nature of the asserted rights and 
interests at stake.  See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 223 (1963) (calling religious freedom an “individual” 
right); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995) (referring to a citizen’s “personal right to equal 
protection of the laws” (emphasis in original)).  Standing is 
easily recognized, for instance, in the case of “a widespread 
mass tort,” even though “large numbers of individuals suffer 
the same common-law injury.”  FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 
24 (1998).  And for good reason: “[t]o deny standing to 
persons who are in fact injured[,] simply because many others 
are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and 
widespread Government actions could be questioned by 
nobody.”  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 n.24 
(2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688).  
Harm to all—even in the nuanced world of standing law—
cannot be logically equated with harm to no one.  
24 
 
Against this background, the City’s reliance on Laird 
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), is misplaced.  The plaintiffs 
there alleged only a “chilling effect” on third parties’ speech 
caused by “the mere existence, without more, of [non-
discriminatory] governmental investigative and data-
gathering activity.”  Id. at 10–11.  Plaintiffs here, by contrast, 
allege that the discriminatory manner by which the Program 
is administered itself causes them direct, ongoing, and 
immediate harm.  Because “standing . . . is only a problem 
where no harm independent of the First Amendment is 
alleged,” Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 383 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(Calabresi, J.), and Laird doesn’t stand for the proposition 
that public surveillance is either per se immune from 
constitutional attack or subject to a heightened requirement of 
injury, that case’s “narrow” holding, see 408 U.S. at 15, 
doesn’t reach the facts of this case. 
Indeed, in several post-Laird cases we have recognized 
that, while surveillance in public places may not of itself 
violate any privacy right,3 it can still violate other rights that 
give rise to cognizable harms.  See, e.g., Hall v. Pa. State 
Police, 570 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Although it may be 
assumed that the state may arrange for photographing all 
suspicious persons entering the bank, it does not follow that 
its criterion for selection may be racially based, in the absence 
of a proven compelling state interest.” (citation omitted)); cf. 
Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 160–61 (3d. Cir. 1997) 
(Roth, J.) (while public governmental surveillance alone was 
not cognizable, identical surveillance conducted in retaliation 
                                              
3 We do not take a position on whether Plaintiffs could have 
brought suit to vindicate such an interest.  They do not allege 
a violation of some constitutional right to privacy, but to 
equal treatment. 
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for one’s exercise of First Amendment rights gave rise to a 
separate injury cognizable under Article III).   
B. Fair Traceability 
The second requirement of injury-in-fact is a causal 
connection between a defendant’s alleged conduct and the 
plaintiff’s harm.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.  The City 
contends that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this requirement 
because the Associated Press (“AP”), not the NYPD, revealed 
the Program to the public and did so without the City’s 
permission.  In short, it argues, “What you don’t know can’t 
hurt you.  And, if you do know, don’t shoot us.  Shoot the 
messenger.”  
Aside from its distortions of the factual record,4 the 
                                              
4 Far from attesting to the NYPD and AP’s respective roles in 
revealing the once-secret Program, the affidavit of defense 
counsel on which the City relies merely states that the AP 
reported on the NYPD’s conduct and “released [unredacted] 
documents to the public at large beginning in . . . August 
2011.”  Decl. of Peter G. Farrell ¶ 3.  It is impossible to infer 
reasonably, let alone conclude, from this statement that the 
AP was the first (or only) public source of the information or 
that the NYPD played no role for which it may be held 
legally responsible.  
Moreover, even if they were required to do so, 
Plaintiffs have produced ample evidence in rebuttal showing 
that: (1) “[a] former NYPD informant . . . independently [of 
the AP] revealed the NYPD’s practice of targeting innocent 
Muslims” by “sp[eaking] publicly in great detail about his 
part in the NYPD’s policy and practice of surveilling 
Muslims on the basis of religion,” Decl. of Glenn Katon ¶ 4; 
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City’s argument is legally untenable because (to repeat) the 
discrimination itself is the legally cognizable injury.  Indeed, 
discrimination often has been likened to a “dignitary tort,” 
see, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974) 
(quoting Charles O. Gregory & Harry Kalven, Jr., Cases and 
Materials on Torts 961 (2d ed. 1969)), where “[t]he tort is 
said to be damage itself,” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of 
Remedies § 7.4(1), at 334 (2d ed. 1993).  And, as with other 
“torts” in this category, “the affront to the other’s 
dignity . . . is as keenly felt by one who only knows after the 
event that an indignity has been perpetrated upon him as by 
one who is conscious of it while it is being perpetrated.”  
Restatement (First) of Torts § 18 cmt. e (1934).  Because we 
view the claimed discrimination itself as the primary injury 
alleged, it “follows from our definition of ‘injury in fact’” that 
the City “is the ‘cause’” of that injury rather than any member 
of the press.  Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. 
Contractors, 508 U.S. at 666 n.5.   
Finally, even if only the collateral consequences of the 
discrimination—rather than the unequal treatment itself—
could count as Article III injury, the City “wrongly 
equat[es] . . . injury ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant with 
injury as to which the defendant’s actions are the very last 
step in the chain of causation.”  Constitution Party of Pa. v. 
Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 366 (3d Cir. 2014) (second alteration 
in original) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–69 
(1997)).  That is incorrect.  “[T]here is room for concurrent 
                                                                                                     
and (2) “[s]ince the AP began publishing reports regarding 
the NYPD’s policy and practice of targeting Muslims for 
surveillance, senior New York City officials have 
acknowledged and endorsed the NYPD’s tactics,” thus 
“propagat[ing] and amplif[ying] the harm,” id. ¶ 3.   
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causation in the analysis of standing, and, indeed, ‘an indirect 
causal relationship will suffice, so long as there is a fairly 
traceable connection.’”  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Toll 
Bros. v. Township of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Block v. 
Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) 
(“[T]he question of core, constitutional injury-in-
fact . . . requires no more than de facto causality.”); Pitt News 
v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000) (“but for” 
causation sufficient to establish traceability to establish 
standing).   
C. Redressability  
The last requirement of Article III standing is 
redressability, which requires the plaintiff to show that 
“it . . . [is] ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that 
the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”  Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).  
Redressability is “easily established in a case where,” as here, 
“the alleged injury arises from an identifiable discriminatory 
policy.”  Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1494 (11th Cir. 
1987).  While we cannot predict “the exact nature of the 
possible relief . . . without a full development of the facts, an 
order enjoining the policy and requiring non-discriminatory 
investigation and enforcement would redress the injury.”  Id.   
As for past harms, the potential avenues for redress 
depend on how a particular plaintiff’s injury shows itself.  
Those plaintiffs able to prove “actual injur[ies]”—i.e., those 
other than “the abstract value of [the] constitutional right[s],” 
such as out-of-pocket losses or emotional distress—may 
recover compensatory damages.  Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986); see also Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264–66 (1978).  For other plaintiffs, 
“the major purpose of the suit may be to obtain a public 
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declaration that the[y are] right and w[ere] improperly 
treated,” see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 901 cmt. c 
(1979), along with nominal damages that serve as “a 
symbolic vindication of [their] constitutional right[s],” 
Schneider v. County of San Diego, 285 F.3d 784, 794 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (quoting Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1403 (9th 
Cir. 1991)).  Given the range of available remedies, 
redressability is easily satisfied.   
* * * * * 
Confident in our jurisdiction to hear this case, we now 
turn to the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims and begin 
with equal protection.    
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
A. Equal-Protection Claim 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to our Constitution provides that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.  
Plaintiffs claim the City is contravening that mandate and 
violating their rights by surveilling them pursuant to a 
Program that investigates persons not because of any 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing (or other neutral 
criterion) but solely because of their Muslim religious 
affiliation.   
A “claim of selective investigation” by the police 
draws on “‘ordinary equal protection standards.’”  Flowers v. 
City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).  
As with other equal-protection claims, we ask whether the 
City intentionally discriminates against a reasonably 
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identifiable group and whether that intentional discrimination 
is nonetheless legally justified.  
1. Do Plaintiffs Plausibly Allege Intentional 
Discrimination?  
To state an equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs must 
allege (and ultimately prove) “intentional discrimination.”  
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Pers. Adm’r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276 (1979).  It is not 
enough for them to allege that they are Muslim and that the 
NYPD surveilled more Muslims than members of any other 
religion.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  Rather, 
Plaintiffs’ religious affiliation must have been a substantial 
factor in that different treatment.  Davis, 426 U.S. at 235; 
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 276.   
i. Plaintiffs Plausibly Allege a 
Surveillance Program with a 
Facially Religious Classification. 
There are a variety of theories to consider in an equal-
protection claim of this type.  First, Plaintiffs could point to a 
policy that is facially discriminatory, meaning that the policy 
“by its own terms” singles out Muslims “for different 
treatment.”  3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise 
on Constitutional Law § 18.4 (10th ed. 2012); see, e.g., 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213, 227–29.  Second, they could 
identify a policy that “either shows no classification on its 
face or else indicates a classification which seems to be 
legitimate,” yet one that NYPD officers apply to Muslims 
with a greater “degree[] of severity” than other religious 
groups.  Rotunda & Novak, supra, § 18.4; see, e.g., Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886).  Or, third, Plaintiffs 
could identify a facially neutral policy that the City 
purposefully “designed to impose different burdens” on 
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Muslims and that (even if applied evenhandedly) does in fact 
have the intended adverse effect.  Rotunda & Novak, supra, 
§ 18.4; see, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Met. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). 
Here, Plaintiffs seek to proceed by way of the first of 
these three methods, arguing their “allegations leave no doubt 
that the . . . [Program] relies on an express classification of 
Muslims for disfavored treatment.”  See Pls.’ Br. 10.  This is 
a viable legal theory.  Where a plaintiff can point to a facially 
discriminatory policy, “the protected trait by definition plays 
a role in the decision-making process, inasmuch as the policy 
explicitly classifies people on that basis.”5  Cmty. Servs. v. 
Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 
726 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Put another way, direct evidence of 
intent is “supplied by the policy itself.”  Massarsky v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 128 (3d Cir. 1983) (Sloviter, J., 
dissenting). 
                                              
5 To the extent the City focuses on Plaintiffs’ failure to allege 
the existence of a written policy, there is no requirement that 
a policy be reduced to written form.  See, e.g., Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499, 502, 509 (2005) (holding that an 
“unwritten [prison] policy of racially segregating prisoners in 
double cells” was subject to strict scrutiny).  As the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, “[t]he primary—indeed, perhaps 
only—difference [between a suit involving a written and 
unwritten policy] is an evidentiary one.”  Hoye v. City of 
Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 855 (9th Cir. 2011).  While a 
“[p]laintiff[] ha[s] no difficulty establishing what a policy is 
when the policy is written,” “[a]n unwritten policy, by 
contrast, is usually harder to establish.”  Id.  
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The City nonetheless attacks the plausibility of the 
allegations, arguing that Plaintiffs point to only “conclusory 
allegations . . . spread throughout [the] . . . [C]omplaint,” 
which “as a matter of law cannot be credited.”  City Br. 56.  It 
further asserts that, “[o]nce the conclusory allegations are 
pushed aside, the remaining factual allegations are 
insufficient to find a facially discriminatory 
classification.”  Id.  
We disagree with this characterization.  While the City 
compares Plaintiffs’ claims to the conclusory allegations in 
Iqbal, those were far from what we have here.  In our case, 
Plaintiffs allege specifics about the Program, including when 
it was conceived (January 2002), where the City implemented 
it (in the New York Metropolitan area with a focus on New 
Jersey), and why it has been employed (because of the belief 
“that Muslim religious identity . . . is a permissible proxy for 
criminality,” Compl. ¶ 36).  The Complaint also articulates 
the “variety of methods” by which the surveillance is carried 
out.  See, e.g., id. ¶ 39 (“tak[ing] videos and photographs at 
mosques, Muslim-owned businesses and schools”); id. 
(“monitor[ing Muslim] websites, listservs, and chat rooms”); 
id. ¶ 46 (“snap[ping] pictures, tak[ing] video, and collect[ing] 
license plate numbers of congregants as they arrive at 
mosques to pray”); id. ¶ 47 (“us[ing] undercover 
officers . . . to monitor daily life in [Muslim] 
neighborhoods . . . and sermons and conversations in 
mosques”); id. ¶ 49 (“plac[ing] informants or undercover 
officers in all or virtually all MSAs”).  These allegations are 
hardly “bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than 
a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional 
discrimination claim.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 545 (2007)).   
Despite the City’s demand for more information about 
when, by whom, and how the policy was enacted and where it 
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was written down, “the Twombly–Iqbal duo have not 
inaugurated an era of evidentiary pleading.”  Santana v. Cook 
Cnty. Bd. of Review, 270 F.R.D. 388, 390 (N.D. Ill. 2010) 
(emphasis in original); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 
(rejecting the proposition that notice pleading “require[s] 
heightened fact pleading of specifics”).  Nor do “factual 
allegations . . . become impermissible labels and conclusions 
simply because the additional factual allegations explaining 
and supporting the articulated factual allegations are not also 
included.”  In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 
753 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
While it is possible that Plaintiffs will ultimately falter in 
meeting their burden of proof, the collection of evidence is 
the object of discovery.   
Moreover, even if the pleading of “evidence” rather 
than “grounds for relief” were required (which it is not), the 
Complaint includes numerous examples of persons that the 
NYPD is surveilling because of their religious affiliation.6  
                                              
6 To the extent the City means to argue that Plaintiffs have 
failed to allege plausibly that even these exemplars have not 
been singled out by reason of their religious affiliation, we 
disagree.  Plaintiffs’ allegations, which draw on the sources of 
circumstantial evidence commonly used to make out a prima 
facie case of intentional discrimination in a disparate-
treatment suit of this type, easily satisfy the plausibility 
threshold required to survive a motion to dismiss.  See, e.g., 
Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 410 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (“maintenance of records of the race of the 
arrestees”); Marshall v. Colum. Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 
1157, 1170 (10th Cir. 2003) (McConnell, J.) (racial 
designation on a driving-citation form “where none was 
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See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 14 (the Masjid al-Haqq and Masjid Ali K. 
Muslim mosques); id. ¶ 17 (MSAs for Rutgers University 
campuses at Newark and New Brunswick); id. ¶ 18 (All Body 
Shop Inside & Outside); id. ¶ 20 (Unity Beef Sausage Co.); 
id. ¶ 22 (the Masjid-e-Ali mosque); id. ¶ 31 (Al-Hidaayah 
Academy); id. (Al Muslimaat Academy).  These allegations 
supplement those that the NYPD “surveil[led] . . . at least 
twenty mosques, fourteen restaurants, eleven retail stores, two 
grade schools and two [MSAs] in New Jersey,” id. ¶ 38; 
“creat[ed] over twenty precinct-level maps of the City of 
Newark,” id.; and attempted to place an “informant inside 
every mosque within a 250-mile radius of New York City” as 
well as prepared an “analytical report on every mosque within 
100 miles,” id. ¶ 47.  
Finally, because Plaintiffs allege that all of these 
persons and entities were surveilled without any reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing (as noted above, they assert that, 
“[i]n all its years of operation, the Program has never 
generated a single [criminal] lead,” id. ¶ 2), this case can be 
easily contrasted with others where the law-enforcement 
investigation at issue was almost certainly explained by a 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.7  Cf. George v. Rehiel, 
                                                                                                     
called for”); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1495–96 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (statistical evidence showing “glaring” effect on 
protected class); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
540, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (disparities between minority 
groups in “hit rates” combined with other evidence); 
Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1141 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (statistical evidence). 
 
7 This of course is not to say that an absence or presence of 
reasonable suspicion in a particular case determines the 
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738 F.3d 562, 586 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The TSA Officials’ 
suspicion was an obvious alternative explanation for their 
conduct, which negates any inference of retaliation.”).  That 
we might be able to conjure up some non-discriminatory 
motive to explain the City’s alleged conduct is not a valid 
basis for dismissal.  It is “only when [a] defendant’s plausible 
                                                                                                     
viability of a plaintiff’s equal-protection claim.  Cf. Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution 
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on 
considerations such as race.  But the constitutional basis for 
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is 
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.  
Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”); United States v. Scopo, 19 
F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir. 1994) (Newman, C.J., concurring) 
(“Though the Fourth Amendment permits a pretext arrest, if 
otherwise supported by probable cause, the Equal Protection 
Clause still imposes restraint on impermissibly class-based 
discriminations.”). 
But although a lack of reasonable suspicion does not 
afford a presumption that a law-enforcement officer initiated 
an investigation on the basis of a protected characteristic, it is 
certainly one factor that may be considered by a finder of 
fact.  See Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 822 n.1 
(6th Cir. 2005) (“While the stop was justified from a Fourth 
Amendment perspective . . . [,] the lack of suspicion . . . may 
properly be considered in the plaintiffs’ selective-
enforcement claim.”); Anderson v. Cornejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 
1008, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing “the lack of adequate 
suspicion for a strip search” as probative of the fact that a 
customs officer “acted, at least in part, because [the plaintiff 
was] an African-American woman”). 
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alternative explanation is so convincing” to render the 
“plaintiff’s explanation . . . implausible” that a court may 
dismiss a complaint.  Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). 
In sum, because Plaintiffs have pleaded ample “factual 
content [that] allows [us] to draw the reasonable inference 
that the [City] is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 663, we decline to dismiss their Complaint on the 
ground that they have not plausibly alleged a surveillance 
program with a facially discriminatory classification.  
ii Intentional Discrimination Does 
Not Require an Invidious Motive. 
The City also argues that, even assuming Plaintiffs 
have plausibly alleged a facial classification based on 
religious affiliation, their allegations of discriminatory 
“purpose” are implausible because “the more likely 
explanation for the NYPD’s actions is public safety rather 
than discrimination based upon religion.”  City Br. 49.  Its 
reasoning is essentially two-fold: “the surveillance is alleged 
to have begun just after the [September 11, 2001] terrorist 
attacks,” id., and “[t]he police could not have monitored New 
Jersey for Muslim terrorist activities without monitoring the 
Muslim community itself,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hassan, 2014 WL 654604, at *6).   
Here’s the City’s problem: there’s a difference 
between “intent” and “motive.”  “[A] defendant acts 
intentionally when he desires a particular result, without 
reference to the reason for such desire.  Motive, on the other 
hand, is the reason why the defendant desires the result.”  2 
Harry Sanger Richards et al., American Law and Procedure 
§ 8, at 6 (1922).  In other words, “intent” asks whether a 
person acts “intentionally or accidentally,” while “motive” 
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asks, “If he did it intentionally, why did he do it?”  1 John 
William Salmond, Jurisprudence § 134, at 398 (7th ed. 1924) 
(emphasis in original); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 881 
(Bryan Garner ed., 10th ed. 2014) (“While motive is the 
inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or 
determination to do it.”).  This fundamental “distinction 
between motive and intent runs all through the law.”  Johnson 
v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 155 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
In focusing on what the City contends was its 
“legitimate purpose[]” of “analy[zing] . . . potential [security] 
threats and vulnerabilities,” City Br. 50, it wrongly assumes 
that invidious motive is a necessary element of discriminatory 
intent.  It is not.  All you need is that the state actor meant to 
single out a plaintiff because of the protected characteristic 
itself.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 
(2008); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 
263, 269–70 (1993).  In a school-segregation case, for 
instance, “the ‘intent’ which triggers a finding of 
unconstitutionality is not an intent to harm black students, but 
simply an intent to bring about or maintain segregated 
schools.”  United States v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 
535 (8th Cir. 1975).  Likewise, a prosecutor who strikes a 
juror on the basis of race discriminates intentionally even if 
motivated by a sincere desire to win his case.  See, e.g., 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).   
So too here.  While the absence of a legitimate motive 
may bear on whether the challenged surveillance survives the 
appropriate level of equal-protection scrutiny, “intentional 
discrimination” need not be motivated by “ill will, enmity, or 
hostility” to contravene the Equal Protection Clause.  Floyd v. 
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 n.7 
(11th Cir. 1999)); see also Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High 
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Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 694 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(distinguishing between “an intent to treat two groups 
differently” and “an intent to harm”); Garza v. County of Los 
Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here can be 
intentional discrimination without an invidious motive.”).  
Thus, even if NYPD officers were subjectively motivated by 
a legitimate law-enforcement purpose (no matter how 
sincere), they’ve intentionally discriminated if they wouldn’t 
have surveilled Plaintiffs had they not been Muslim.  
2. Is the Alleged Discrimination 
Nonetheless Legally Justified?  
Once a plaintiff demonstrates treatment different from 
others with whom he or she is similarly situated and that the 
unequal treatment is the result of intentional discrimination, 
“the adequacy of the reasons for that discrimination 
are . . . separately assessed at equal protection’s second step” 
under the appropriate standard of review.  SECSYS, LLC v. 
Vigil, 666 F.3d 678, 689 (10th Cir. 2012).  To apply this 
traditional legal framework to the facts of this case, we must 
determine the appropriate standard of review (i.e., rational 
basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny) and then ask 
whether it is met.8 
i. Level of Scrutiny 
At a minimum, intentional discrimination against any 
“identifiable group” is subject to rational-basis review, which 
                                              
8 Although other modes of analysis have also been employed, 
see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015), 
we find it appropriate to apply the conventional two-part 
framework in the context of this case. 
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requires the classification to be rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental purpose.  Johnson v. Cohen, 836 
F.2d 798, 805 n.9 (3d Cir. 1987).  Where a “quasi-suspect” or 
“suspect” classification is at issue, however, the challenged 
action must survive “intermediate scrutiny” or “strict 
scrutiny.” 9  Intermediate scrutiny (applicable to quasi-suspect 
classes like gender and illegitimacy) requires that a 
classification “be substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.”  Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 
(1988).  In contrast, strict scrutiny (applicable to suspect 
classes like race and nationality) is an even more demanding 
standard, which requires the classification be “narrowly 
tailored . . . [to] further [a] compelling governmental 
interest[].”  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).  
Strict and intermediate scrutiny (which we collectively refer 
to as “heightened scrutiny” to distinguish them from the far 
less demanding rational-basis review) in effect set up a 
presumption of invalidity that the defendant must rebut.   
Perhaps surprisingly, neither our Court nor the 
Supreme Court has considered whether classifications based 
on religious affiliation10 trigger heightened scrutiny under the 
                                              
9 “Strict scrutiny” is also triggered in the case of a 
“fundamental right.”  While “the right to free exercise of 
religion” is fundamental, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 404, Plaintiffs 
proceed in this case on the theory that religious affiliation is a 
protected class.  
  
10 We refer in this opinion only to discrimination based on 
religious affiliation rather than involvement.  Case law 
distinguishes between the two.  See, e.g., United States v. 
DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003) (Fuentes, J.) 
(“Because we affirm the District Court’s finding that the 
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Equal Protection Clause.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe 
Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the 
Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 909, 
919 (2013); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary 
Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1753, 1783 (1996).  We therefore confront a question of 
first impression in this Circuit.  
Although the answer to this question is not found in 
binding precedent, we hardly write on a clean slate.  To start, 
it has long been implicit in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
that religious classifications are treated like others 
traditionally subject to heightened scrutiny, such as those 
based on race.  United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 
(1996) (naming “race” and “religion” as examples of 
“unjustifiable standard[s]” for a “decision whether to 
                                                                                                     
government’s strikes were based on the jurors’ heightened 
religious involvement rather than their religious affiliation, 
we need not reach the issue of whether a peremptory strike 
based solely on religious affiliation would be 
unconstitutional.”); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 
1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) (explaining that “[i]t is 
necessary to distinguish among religious affiliation, a 
religion’s general tenets, and a specific religious belief”), 
modified, 136 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 1998).  Nor do we mean to 
state a position on the separate “question of whether all 
religions together constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class.”  
Christian Sci. Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City of 
San Francisco, 807 F.2d 1466, 1467 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(Norris, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(stating this as a separate issue that the panel expressly 
declined to decide). 
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prosecute” (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 
(1962))); Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 
(1992) (referring to “race” and “religion” as “classif[ications] 
along suspect lines”); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17 
(1979) (calling “race, religion, [and] alienage . . . inherently 
suspect distinctions”); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 
U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (same); United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979) (listing “race” and “religion” as 
“unjustifiable standard[s]” under our Constitution (quoting 
Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456)); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville 
R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 209 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(“The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic 
discrimination is applied under authority of law against any 
race, creed or color.”). 
This line of comment can be traced back to the famous 
footnote four of the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in 
Carolene Products, where the Court suggested that 
discriminatory legislation should “be subjected to more 
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” if “directed at particular 
religious, or national, or racial minorities.”  United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added).  And even before Carolene 
Products, the Court considered religious discrimination to be 
a classic example of “a denial of the equal protection of the 
laws to the less favored classes.”  Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. 
Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900); see also Hall v. De Cuir, 
95 U.S. 485, 505 (1877) (“Directors of schools in 
Iowa . . . [cannot] deny a youth of proper age admission to 
any particular school on account of nationality, color, or 
religion.”). 
It is true that these statements are dicta.  But even so, 
Supreme Court dicta “requires serious consideration,” United 
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 90 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010), 
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“especially . . . when, as here, we encounter a decades-long 
succession of statements from the Court,” Myers v. Loudoun 
Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 410 (4th Cir. 2005) (D. Motz, 
J., concurring in the judgment).  Moreover, this dicta is 
consistent with our own.  Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 
706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013) (identifying “race, religion, 
[and] alienage” as “inherently suspect distinctions” (quoting 
Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. DeJesus, 
347 F.3d 500, 510–11 (3d Cir. 2003) (Fuentes, J.) (referring 
in dictum to “religious affiliation” as “a protected class”); 
Tolchin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099, 
1114 (3d Cir. 1997) (naming “race, religion or alienage” as 
“suspect distinctions”); United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 
1531, 1537 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he government can[not] 
refuse to move for a downward[] departure under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(e) [if] . . . base[d] . . . on a constitutionally suspect 
ground such as race or religion.”).   
We also are guided by other appellate courts that have 
subjected religious-based classifications to heightened 
scrutiny.  For instance, both the Eighth and Tenth Circuit 
Courts have held without fanfare that “[r]eligion is a suspect 
classification,” Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1322 
n.10 (10th Cir. 2010); Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 
F.3d 807, 816 (8th Cir. 2008), and the Second and Ninth have 
done the same in so many words, see, e.g., United States v. 
Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 668 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J.) 
(holding that the exercise of a peremptory strike due to a 
venire member’s religious affiliation would violate Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), because “religious 
classifications . . . trigger strict scrutiny”); Christian Sci. 
Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City of San Francisco, 
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784 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1986) (“It seems clear that an 
individual religion meets the requirements for treatment as a 
suspect class.”), amended, 792 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1986).11    
 Today we join these courts and hold that intentional 
discrimination based on religious affiliation must survive 
                                              
11 Some appellate courts have recognized the question as an 
open one, see, e.g., St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City 
of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 2007); Wirzburger v. 
Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 283 (1st Cir. 2005); Taylor v. Johnson, 
257 F.3d 470, 473 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), but we 
are not aware of a single circuit court holding that religious 
classifications are subject to only rational-basis review.  
We also note that numerous state courts either have 
held that religious affiliation is a suspect classification or 
have issued opinions with strong dicta to that effect.  See, 
e.g., Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 728 A.2d 127, 137 (Me. 
1999); Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep’t, 887 
P.2d 747, 751 (N.M. 1994); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of 
Saguache v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 982 n.9 (Colo. 1984) 
(en banc); State v. Correll, 626 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tenn. 
1982); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 of St. 
Charles Parish, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1386 n.3 (La. 1978); Gunn 
v. Lane County, 20 P.3d 247, 251 (Or. App. 2001); LaCava v. 
Lucander, 791 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).  But 
see State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“In addition to being a fundamental right, religious affiliation 
also may be a suspect classification under the Equal 
Protection Clause.” (emphasis added)); State v. Davis, 504 
N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115 
(1994); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1994).  
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heightened equal-protection review.  Before turning more 
fully to our reasoning, however, we pause to reiterate that the 
term “heightened scrutiny,” as we use it, encompasses both 
“intermediate scrutiny” and “strict scrutiny.”  Because the 
City bears the burden of production and proof with respect to 
both, see infra Part IV(A)(2), we need not—and should 
not12—determine in connection with its motion to dismiss 
which of the two applies, and we leave that question for the 
District Court in the first instance when and if it becomes 
necessary to decide it. 
 In designating a particular classification as “suspect” 
or “quasi-suspect” under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Supreme Court generally considers a variety of factors 
“grouped around [the] central idea” of “whether the 
discrimination embodies a gross unfairness that is [so] 
sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to 
term it ‘invidious.’”  Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 
724–25 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring in the 
                                              
12 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“It is not the habit of the court to 
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely 
necessary to a decision of the case.” (quoting Burton v. 
United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905))); Liverpool, N.Y. & 
Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 
(1885) (“In the exercise of [its] jurisdiction, [the Court 
must] . . . never . . . formulate a rule of constitutional law 
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to 
be applied.”); Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 
450, 461 (1945) (“It has long been [the Court’s] considered 
practice not . . . to decide any constitutional question in 
advance of the necessity for its decision.”). 
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judgment).  Among these are “whether the . . . class is defined 
by a[n] [immutable] trait that ‘frequently bears no relation to 
ability to perform or contribute to society’” and “whether the 
class has been saddled with unique disabilities because of 
prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes.”  Id. at 725 (quoting 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality 
opinion)).  But while these factors are those most often 
considered, “[n]o single talisman can define those groups 
likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . ; experience, not abstract logic, 
must be the primary guide.”  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).   
Courts first have looked with particular suspicion on 
discrimination based on “immutable human attributes.”  
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality 
opinion).  Accordingly, a classification is more likely to 
receive heightened scrutiny if it discriminates against 
individuals based on a characteristic that they either cannot 
realistically change or ought not be compelled to change 
because it is fundamental to their identities.  See, e.g., Baskin 
v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) 
(framing this issue as whether “the unequal treatment [is] 
based on some immutable or at least tenacious characteristic 
of the people discriminated against” as opposed to a 
“characteristic[] that [is] easy for a person to change, such as 
the length of his or her fingernails”); Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 
(Norris, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court is willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if 
changing it would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a 
major physical change or a traumatic change of identity.”). 
Religious affiliation falls within this category.  As we 
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have recognized in the immigration context,13 religious 
affiliation is typically seen as “capable of being changed,” yet 
“of such fundamental importance that individuals should not 
be required to modify it.”14  Ghebrehiwot v. Attorney Gen. of 
U.S., 467 F.3d 344, 357 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Escobar v. 
Gonzalez, 417 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also Baskin, 
766 F.3d at 655 (Posner, J.) (listing “religion” as an example 
of “a deep psychological commitment” that would qualify for 
                                              
13 Other courts have drawn on the definition of “immutable” 
in immigration cases when defining the term in the context of 
an equal-protection suit.  Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464 n.4 
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting an immigration case for the 
proposition that “[s]exual orientation and sexual identity are 
immutable; they are so fundamental to one’s identity that a 
person should not be required to abandon them” (alteration in 
original)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931 (2015). 
 
14 Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech 
in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 833, 852 
(2011) (recognizing that religion lies “at the core of many 
individuals’ understanding of their identity”); David B. 
Salmons, Comment, Toward a Fuller Understanding of 
Religious Exercise: Recognizing the Identity-Generative and 
Expressive Nature of Religious Devotion, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1243, 1258 (1995) (noting the “fundamental role [that 
religious preference] play[s] in shaping an individual’s 
concept of identity and personhood”); Note, Reinterpreting 
the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and 
Conceptions of the Self, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1474 (1984) 
(“A society that failed to protect religion would foreclose the 
individual’s choice of the most fundamental part of his 
identity.”). 
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heightened scrutiny).  Moreover, while some immutable 
characteristics, such as intellectual disability, are so often 
correlated with “a person’s ability to participate in society” 
that we frequently deem them to be constitutionally 
permissible bases for discrimination, see Baskin, 766 F.3d at 
655, a person’s religious affiliation is at the other end of that 
spectrum.   
Religious discrimination, “by [its] very nature,” has 
long been thought “odious to a free people whose institutions 
are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”  Bell v. Maryland, 
378 U.S. 226, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943) 
(“[For] Jefferson and those who followed 
him[,] . . . [r]eligious minorities as well as religious majorities 
were to be equal in the eyes of the political state.”); President 
James Madison, Religious Freedom: A Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against the General Assessment, in “A Bill 
Establishing Provision for the Teachers of the Christian 
Religion,” Presented to the General Assembly of Virginia, at 
the Session of 1785 (1819) (“A just Government . . . will be 
best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of 
his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his 
person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights 
of any Sect, nor suffering any sect to invade those of 
another.”).  
Courts also are more likely to subject classifications 
that are “closely associated with inequality” to a more 
searching inquiry.  Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 
1996 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013).  Thus, if the classification is accompanied by a 
history of “discrimination based on archaic and overbroad 
assumptions,” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 
(1984), or if it has been traditionally used as a tool for the 
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oppression and subordination of minority groups, see, e.g., 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495–96 
(1989) (plurality opinion), heightened scrutiny often is more 
appropriately applied. 
The history of religious discrimination in the United 
States is intertwined with that based on other protected 
characteristics, including national origin and race.15  Saint 
Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611–12 (1987) 
(noting that “[t]he Ninth edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica . . . referred to Arabs, Jews, and other ethnic 
groups such as Germans, Hungarians, and Greeks, as separate 
races” (citations omitted)); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893) (referring to “Chinese laborers” as 
                                              
15 Indeed, the close relationship among race, religion, 
ethnicity, and national origin is reflected by the allegations in 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint.  See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 40 (“In addition to 
targeting Muslims by focusing on mosques, Muslim-owned 
businesses, and other Muslim-associated organizations as 
subjects of surveillance, the Program also intentionally targets 
Muslims by using ethnicity as a proxy for faith.”); id. ¶ 41 
(“As part of the Program, the Department has designated 
twenty-eight countries and ‘American Black Muslim’ as 
‘ancestries of interest.’”); id. ¶ 53 (“To facilitate future 
surveillance of entire American Muslim communities, the 
NYPD has created maps indicating the locations of mosques, 
restaurants, retail establishments, and schools owned by or 
serving Muslims, as well as ethnic populations from heavily 
Muslim countries.”); id. ¶ 55 (“The NYPD also inspects 
records of name changes and compiles databases of new 
Muslim converts who take Arabic names, as well as Muslims 
who take names that are perceived to be ‘Western.’”). 
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“of a distinct race and religion”); In re Halladjian, 174 F. 
834, 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) (“A Hindoo . . . differs in color 
no less from a Chinaman than from an Anglo-Saxon . . . .”); 
Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal 
Construction of Arab American Identity, 69 N.Y.U. Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 29, 33 (2013) (noting that “the conflation of 
Arab and Muslim identity was deeply entrenched within the 
courts during the Naturalization Era” and that “Islam was 
treated as an ethno-racial identity”). 
It is thus unsurprising that tampering with religious 
affiliation brings into play the same concerns of inequality.  
Though “[n]othing but the most telling of personal 
experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears 
could have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion 
any more deeply in our heritage,” Schempp, 374 U.S. at 214 
(citation omitted), we have struggled to guarantee religious 
equality since our Nation’s founding.  See generally Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1947); 
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616 
(1987); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 
236 (1957); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 
(1943).  Different religious groups have borne the brunt of 
majority oppression during different times, and the battle 
against religious prejudice continues.  See, e.g., U.S. Patriot 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, § 102(a)(3), 115 Stat. 274 (“The 
acts of violence that have been taken against Arab and 
Muslim Americans since the September 11, 2001, attacks 
against the United States should be and are condemned by all 
Americans who value freedom.”); Brief in Support of 
Appellants by Amici Curiae the Asian American Legal 
Defense & Education Fund & 17 Other Non-Governmental 
Organizations Supporting Civil Rights for American 
Muslims 11–22. 
In light of this history, distinctions between citizens on 
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religious grounds pose a particularly acute “danger of stigma 
and stirred animosities.”  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. 
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment); see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 
376 U.S. 52, 67 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“When 
racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the 
multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution 
seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms 
that relate to race or to religion . . . are generated . . . .”); Kunz 
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 313 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“If any two subjects are intrinsically incendiary 
and divisive, they are race and religion.”).  That “[c]enturies 
of experience testify that laws aimed at one . . . religious 
group . . . generate hatreds and prejudices which rapidly 
spread beyond control,”  Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 448 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting), also 
counsels in favor of heightened scrutiny.  
A final relevant consideration is whether the 
Legislative and Executive Branches have concluded that a 
form of discrimination is inherently invidious.  In holding 
gender to be a “quasi-suspect” classification deserving of 
intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court noted, for instance, 
in Frontiero that, because Congress is “a coequal branch of 
Government,” its “conclu[sion] that classifications based 
upon sex are inherently invidious . . . [was] not without 
significance to the question [then] under consideration.”  411 
U.S. at 687–88.    
Many of the same statutes that foreclose sex-based 
discrimination, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 cited by the Frontiero Court, see id. at 687, also forbid 
religious discrimination.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(making it an “unlawful employment practice” for an 
employer to discriminate based on “race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin”).  And from the passage of the Civil Rights 
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Act of 1875,16 to those designed to strengthen national 
security in our post-September 11 world,17 that commitment 
to the “sacrosanct . . . concept” of equality among “all 
religious . . . groups,” see U.S. Patriot Act of 
2001§ 102(a)(3), is embodied throughout the U.S. Code.  See, 
e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (employment); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 3106a(1)(B), (2)(B) (banking); 12 U.S.C. § 4545 (fair 
housing); 22 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (Peace Corps service); 49 
U.S.C. § 40127 (air transportation and use of private airports). 
The same commitment to religious equality is seen in 
the pronouncements of the Executive Branch, from those of 
our first President, George Washington, to our current 
President, Barack Obama.  See, e.g., President George 
Washington, Address to the Members of the New Church in 
Baltimore (Jan. 1793), in 2 Jared Sparks, Life of George 
Washington Commander-in-Chief of the American Armies: to 
Which Are Added, His Diaries and Speeches; and Various 
                                              
16 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (“[I]t is essential 
to just government we recognize the equality of all men 
before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in 
its dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact 
justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, color, or persuasion, 
religious or political . . . .”). 
 
17 See, e.g., U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 
§ 102(a)(3), b(3), 115 Stat. 274 (“The concept of individual 
responsibility for wrongdoing is sacrosanct in American 
society, and applies equally to all religious, racial, and ethnic 
groups. . . . [T]he Nation is called upon to recognize the 
patriotism of fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial, and 
religious backgrounds.”). 
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Miscellaneous Papers Relating to His Habits & Opinions 
314, 314–15 (1839) (“In this enlightened age, and in this land 
of equal liberty, it is our boast that a man’s religious tenets 
will not forfeit the protection of the laws, nor deprive him of 
the right of attaining and holding the highest offices that are 
known in the United States.”); President Harry Truman, 
Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights (Feb. 2, 
1948) (“Racial, religious and other invidious forms of 
discrimination deprive the individual of an equal chance to 
develop and utilize his talents and to enjoy the rewards of his 
efforts.”); President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual 
Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1906) (“[W]e must treat with 
justice and good will all immigrants who come here under the 
law[,] . . . [w]hether they are Catholic or Protestant, Jew or 
Gentile . . . .”); President Barack Obama, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 28, 2014) (“[W]e believe in the inherent dignity 
and equality of every human being, regardless of race or 
religion, creed or sexual orientation.”). 
For these reasons, we conclude that classifications on 
the basis of religious affiliation are subject to heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  
ii. Evaluation of Means and Ends 
The final step in evaluating an equal-protection claim 
is to examine the challenged action’s “means” and “ends” and 
the “fit” between the two.  The specific analysis differs 
depending on the level of scrutiny that applies.  The higher 
the scrutiny required, the more persuasive must be the 
governmental objective and the snugger the means-ends fit.  
Thus, while it usually matters little for purposes of rational-
basis review that a governmental interest is not exceedingly 
important or that “other means are better suited to the 
achievement of governmental ends,” heightened scrutiny 
demands a much stronger justification and a much tighter 
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relationship “between the means employed and the ends 
served.”  Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77–78 (2001) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Also increasingly demanding is the standard of proof.  
While the rational-basis standard usually puts the burden of 
proof on the classification’s opponent and “permits a court to 
hypothesize interests that might support [the governmental] 
distinctions,” id. at 77 (emphasis added) (citing Heller v. Doe, 
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 155 
(1980)), the burden of justification under both intermediate  
and strict scrutiny “is demanding and . . . rests entirely on the 
State,” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).  
See also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (discussing the standard and 
burden for intermediate scrutiny); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (strict scrutiny).  
Here, the City argues that “[a] comprehensive 
understanding of the makeup of the community would help 
the NYPD figure out where to look—and where not to look—
in the event it received information that an Islamist 
radicalized to violence may be secreting himself in New 
Jersey.”  City Br. 50.  It even goes so far as to assert that “it 
would be irresponsible for the NYPD not to have an 
understanding of the varied mosaic that is the Muslim 
community to respond to such threats.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
But because heightened scrutiny applies in this case, we 
cannot accept the City’s invitation to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint based on its assurance that the Program is justified 
by national-security and public-safety concerns.  Rather, the 
burden of producing evidence to overcome heightened 
scrutiny’s presumption of unconstitutionality is that of the 
City, cf. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1163 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“When, as here, a race-based 
affirmative action plan is subjected to strict scrutiny, the party 
defending the plan bears the burden of producing evidence 
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that the plan is constitutional.”), and must be met after its 
Motion to Dismiss.   
To be clear, we acknowledge that a principal reason 
for a government’s existence is to provide security.  But while 
we do not question the legitimacy of the City’s interest, “[t]he 
gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions 
concerning what means law enforcement officers may employ 
to pursue a given purpose.”  City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).  Rather, heightened scrutiny requires 
that the relationship between the asserted justification and 
discriminatory means employed “be substantiated by 
objective evidence.”  Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of New 
York v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 53 (2d Cir. 2002).  
“[M]ere speculation or conjecture is insufficient,” id., as are 
appeals to “‘common sense’ which might be inflected by 
stereotypes,” Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 526 
(7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).  See also Lomack v. City of 
Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing with 
approval Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, 310 F.3d at 52–53).   
And “[e]ven in the limited circumstance” where a 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification “is permissible to 
further [an important or] compelling state interest, the 
government is still ‘constrained in how it may pursue that 
end.’”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U.S. 899, 908 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  While “[a] classification does not fail rational-
basis review because it is not made with mathematical nicety 
or because in practice it results in some inequality,” Heller, 
509 U.S. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted), strict 
scrutiny requires that “the classification at issue . . . ‘fit’ with 
greater precision than any alternative means,” Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of 
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Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 
n.26 (1974)).  Intermediate scrutiny falls somewhere in 
between the two, asking if there is a “direct, substantial 
relationship between objective and means.”  Hogan, 458 U.S. 
at 725. 
No matter how tempting it might be to do otherwise, 
we must apply the same rigorous standards even where 
national security is at stake.  We have learned from 
experience that it is often where the asserted interest appears 
most compelling that we must be most vigilant in protecting 
constitutional rights.  “[H]istory teaches that grave threats to 
liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional 
rights seem too extravagant to endure.”  Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The lesson of 
Korematsu [v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944)] is 
that national security constitutes a ‘pressing public necessity,’ 
though the government’s use of [a suspect classification] to 
advance that objective must be [appropriately] tailored.”); 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (“The 
World War II relocation-camp cases and the Red scare and 
McCarthy-era internal subversion cases are only the most 
extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms 
to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we 
invariably come to regret it.” (citations omitted)). 
Today it is acknowledged, for instance, that the F.D.R. 
Administration and military authorities infringed the 
constitutional rights of Japanese-Americans during World 
War II by placing them under curfew and removing them 
from their West Coast homes and into internment camps.  Yet 
when these citizens pleaded with the courts to uphold their 
constitutional rights, we passively accepted the Government’s 
representations that the use of such classifications was 
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necessary to the national interest.  Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81; 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.  In doing so, we failed to recognize 
that the discriminatory treatment of approximately 120,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry was fueled not by military 
necessity but unfounded fears.  See United States v. Hohri, 
482 U.S. 64, 66 (1987); see also Act to Implement 
Recommendations on the Commission of Wartime Relocation 
and Internment of Civilians, Pub. L. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 
Stat. 903-04 (1988).  Given that “unconditional deference to 
[the] government[’s] . . . invocation of ‘emergency’ . . . has a 
lamentable place in our history,” Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Ass’n, 310 F.3d at 53–54 (citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223), 
the past should not preface yet again bending our 
constitutional principles merely because an interest in 
national security is invoked. 
In sum, because Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that 
the City engaged in intentional discrimination against a 
protected class, and because that classification creates a 
presumption of unconstitutionality that remains the City’s 
obligation to rebut, Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
B. First-Amendment Claims 
We finally reach Plaintiffs’ claims under the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment.  They allege violations of 
both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, 
which respectively prohibit the making of any “law 
respecting an establishment of religion” or “prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”  U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
Plaintiffs bring both claims under the theory that the 
First Amendment demands strict governmental neutrality 
among religious sects.  While it is intuitive that 
discriminatory conduct that inhibits a person’s full religious 
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expression may run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment, under the facts here the same is 
counterintuitive for the Establishment Clause, as the latter 
“tend[s] to [involve] challenge[s] to governmental 
endorsement.”  Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights 
v. City of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1050 n.20 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (emphasis added).  But see Colo. Christian 
Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(McConnell, J.) (“[S]tatutes involving discrimination on the 
basis of religion, including interdenominational 
discrimination, are subject to heightened scrutiny whether 
they arise under the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment 
Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause . . . .” (citations 
omitted)).  However, a full discussion of either Religion 
Clause and its application to our case is unnecessary, as we 
confine ourselves to the City’s arguments raised in its Motion 
to Dismiss.  Those arguments are unpersuasive.   
The City first argues that, “according to a three month 
fact finding investigation by the New Jersey Attorney 
General, the surveillance Program did not violate New Jersey 
civil or criminal law.”  City Br. 44.  That this argument could 
defeat a federal constitutional claim, let alone on a motion to 
dismiss, borders on the frivolous.  Aside from a court’s 
inability to consider such matters extraneous to the pleadings 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it is the 
United States Constitution—not the “civil or criminal law” of 
New Jersey—that Plaintiffs seek to enforce.  But even more 
fundamentally, the New Jersey Attorney General’s legal 
conclusion is not helpful in determining whether the City 
violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  “It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department”—not the 
New Jersey executive—“to say what the law is.”  Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).   
The City’s only other argument (aside from a few 
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scattered citations to free-speech and privacy cases that have 
little application to Plaintiffs’ religion claims) is buried in a 
footnote in its brief amidst a discussion of the Equal 
Protection Clause: 
[Plaintiffs have also failed to] allege[] a 
classification that violates the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment 
because such claims [similarly] require a 
showing of discriminatory purpose.  See 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (“Here, as in 
equal protection cases, we may determine the 
city council’s object from both direct and 
circumstantial evidence.”)) [sic]; Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (in 
order to survive an Establishment Clause 
challenge, the government practice must 
(1) have a secular purpose, (2) have a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion, and (3) not foster excessive state 
entanglement with religion). 
City Br. 58 n.20 (emphasis added).  A sentence-long 
argument buried in a footnote is hardly a satisfactory way to 
tackle two of the most jurisprudentially challenging and 
nuanced areas of our law.  Schempp, 374 U.S. at 246 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting “the difficulty . . . endemic 
to issues implicating the religious guarantees of the First 
Amendment”); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 
1282 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the Establishment 
Clause is “an area notorious for its difficult case law”); 
Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1410–11 (7th Cir. 
1991) (“[C]ases arising under the Religion Clauses of the 
[F]irst [A]mendment have presented some of the most 
perplexing questions in constitutional law.”).  We therefore 
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consider this argument waived.  John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. 
CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(Alito, J.) (“[A]rguments raised in passing (such as in a 
footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived.”). 
 But even if we were to consider the City’s halfhearted 
assertion that allegations of overt hostility and prejudice are 
required to make out claims under the First Amendment, this 
argument would easily fail, just as did the identical argument 
with respect to the Equal Protection Clause.  While the 
contours of neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment 
Clause are static and well defined, courts have repeatedly 
rejected the notion that either Clause “is . . . confined to 
actions based on animus.”  Laurence H. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law §§ 5–16, at 956 (3d ed. 2000) (“[A] law 
that is not neutral or that is not generally applicable can 
violate the Free Exercise Clause without regard to the motives 
of those who enacted the measure.”); see also Shrum v. City 
of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1144–45 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(McConnell, J.) (“Proof of hostility or discriminatory 
motivation may be sufficient to prove that a challenged 
governmental action is not neutral, but the Free Exercise 
Clause is not confined to actions based on animus.” (citations 
omitted)); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(Tamm, J., concurring) (noting that, under the Establishment 
Clause, “good motives cannot save impermissible actions”).  
At bottom, the City needs something other than this 
threadbare argument based on the absence of subjective 
hostility to avoid a non-swinging strikeout.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 The allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint tell a story in 
which there is standing to complain and which present 
constitutional concerns that must be addressed and, if true, 
redressed.  Our job is judicial.  We “can apply only law, and 
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must abide by the Constitution, or [we] cease to be civil 
courts and become instruments of [police] policy.”  
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).   
We believe that statement of Justice Jackson to be on 
the right side of history, and for a majority of us in quiet 
times it remains so . . . until the next time there is the fear of a 
few who cannot be sorted out easily from the many.  Even 
when we narrow the many to a class or group, that 
narrowing—here to those affiliated with a major worldwide 
religion—is not near enough under our Constitution.  “[T]o 
infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group 
disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against the entire 
group is to deny that under our system of law individual guilt 
is the sole basis for deprivation of rights.”  Id. at 240 
(Murphy, J., dissenting).   
 What occurs here in one guise is not new.  We have 
been down similar roads before.  Jewish-Americans during 
the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights 
Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II are 
examples that readily spring to mind.  We are left to wonder 
why we cannot see with foresight what we see so clearly with 
hindsight—that “[l]oyalty is a matter of the heart and mind[,] 
not race, creed, or color.”  Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 
283, 302 (1944). 
 We reverse and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurrence. 
 I agree that plaintiffs have demonstrated standing and 
made sufficient allegations of violations of equal-protection 
rights.. I differ from the majority in its failure to determine 
whether “intermediate scrutiny” or “strict scrutiny” applies 
here.  In our determinations so far, we have also, I believe, 
made the findings necessary to resolve the issue of the 
appropriate level of scrutiny. 
 
 In my opinion, “intermediate scrutiny” is appropriate 
here.  I say this because “intermediate scrutiny” is the level 
applied in gender discrimination cases.  I have the immutable 
characteristic of being a woman.  I am happy with this 
condition, but during my 80 years on this earth, it has caused 
me at times to suffer gender discrimination.  My remedy now 
for any future gender discrimination would be reviewed with 
“intermediate scrutiny.”  For that reason, I cannot endorse a 
level of scrutiny in other types of discrimination cases that 
would be stricter than the level which would apply to 
discrimination against me as a woman. 
